[index]
Talk of a Two-State Solution
Craig Turner, 9 December 2024
--

There is a recurring claim that a /Two-State Solution/ is needed for there to
be positive progress between Israel and people of the Palestinian Territories.

This is often a lightweight position, with advocates unwilling to detail or
defend how it could work beyond international recognition.

Here I will attempt to engage with the root causes of the persistent
instability in the region, and speculate on what it would take to create a
Palestinian State that operated for the benefit of its citizens.

The strategy outlined here describes a hypothetical pathway. I don't think the
necessary factors will align to allow it to happen. Nevertheless, there is
value in understanding what it would take, because it allows us to make better
judgements about decisions that affect the region.

Why should we care?

    There are millions of Palestinian Arabs stuck in some form of uncertain
    sovereignty, which presents unreasonable quality-of-life problems for
    those people.

    Palestinian groups are a recurring source of instability. They were a
    factor in the start of the Lebanese Civil War, and have at times attempted
    to seize power in Jordan. Israel has recurring security problems in Gaza
    and the West Bank.

Niall Ferguson has stated that institutions are the key building blocks for
functioning states. He gives the example of East and West Germany, and North
and South Korea. In each case, these are cultures that are separated at first
only by institutions. Institutional differences caused them to evolve into
different creatures. [1]

In late 2024, several factors combine to open a new opportunity to make
meaningful change,

    The recent war has weakened Hamas yet not strengthened Fatah.

    The levelling of Gaza offers a clean-slate rebuild of a distinct
    geographic region.

    There has been a withdrawl of destabilising powers. In recent history
    Russia, Iran, Iraq, and Syria have sought to cultivate Palestinians as a
    proxy. But in the current climate each of them is weakened and focused on
    other projects.

    The re-election of Donald Trump may create an atmosphere for fresh
    thinking.

In this paper I will attempt to describe a program for bootstrapping a
functioning Palestinian state within this change window. [2]

These are the most significant obstacles to a Palestinian state,

    1. Failed institutions. The region of Palestine is dominated by powers
    that routinely practice corruption and readily use extra-judicial violence
    to suppress dissent. The region's institutions are destitute and the
    civilian populations live in fear of these groups.

    2. State of denial. With encouragement from much of the international
    community, Palestinian interests maintain a state of denial about the
    outcomes of 1948 and other wars, with those real outcomes being: that
    Israel won and that Israel has sovereignty over the territory it occupies.
    Palestinian interests keep revisiting the matter, through disorder, war
    and terrorism, and through a claim to a 'right of return'.

Any proposal for a Palestinian state must offer convincing fixes to these
obstacles.

Palestine's political powers,

    The Palestinian Territories are dominated by interests that follow two
    incompatible world-views: Arab Nationalism and Islamism,

        Arab nationalism seeks to create an Arab nation with a single
        ethnicity, culture and politics. This is a type of politics that
        westerners readily call /fascism/ when discussing European politics.

        Islamism wants religious and state power to be merged in a form of
        rule known as Sharia.

    Fatah are the current ruling group in the West Bank territories, and are
    the most prominent Arab Nationalists within the territories.

    Hamas are the dominant power in Gaza and the most prominent of the
    Islamist groups. There are Islamists in the West Bank also.

    The two groups have been able to coexist only due their common struggle
    against Israel. [3]

    Each ethos is exclusive,

        It is not possible to support the cause of Arab Nationalism whilst
        also respecting a neighbour's opposition to it.

        It is not possible to support the cause of Islamism whilst also
        respecting your neighbour's decision to reject Sharia.

    Hence, the region has two rival philosophies, each of which rejects the
    principle of live-and-let-live. It will not be possible to cultivate a
    live-and-let-live ethos while either of these philosophies flourish.

    It would take deliberate and sustained activity to stamp out the various
    strains of Arab Nationalism and Islamism that are active in the region,
    and this is a necessary pre-requisite for stable government.

Here, I propose a Western collaboration to bootstrap a state,

    The US supplies executive authority in the form of a Governor and engages
    with Israel to ensure its ongoing confidence.

    France appoints police and customs leadership, with each reporting to the
    US governor.

    Great Britain or another Commonwealth country bootstraps a common-law
    legal system. [4]

Detail,

    Start small,

        Taking on governance for all Palestinian Territories is too much
        challenge for the initial project.

        If the world can bootstrap one successful Palestinian state, then it
        will be possible to apply similar patterns and lessons learnt to other
        regions later.

        The initial goal here is to bootstrap a successful state that is run
        by Palestinians within a smaller territory.

    Focus on Gaza, or a subdivision of Gaza,

        Gaza has been flattened, and will need to be rebuilt.

        It looks increasingly likely that Israel will subdivide it into three
        or more sectors, separated by Israeli-run security corridors.

        That suits this project well, because it allows us to focus on
        achieving good governance within well-defined and secure borders.

    Proven western institutions,

        The West originated in Western European countries under the strong
        influence of Christianity.

        Within the last century, our concept Western identity has gradually
        changed.

        It is now mostly about institutions that respect individual-agency and
        the principle of live-and-let-live.

        In our era, some of the most successful countries are western in the
        institutional sense, whilst not being culturally European: Japan,
        Singapore, Taiwan.

        Israel is also a successful western country.

        For this project, we will be seeking to bootstrap a Palestinian state
        that is based on a foundation of proven western institutions.

    All parties to respect Israeli sovereignty of Israeli territory,

        The concept of the Right of Return was a western invention, initially
        opposed by Arab interests. Western nations continue to pay lip-service
        to it. It is a form of posturing, a serenade intended for domestic
        voters who sympathise with the poor circumstances of the average
        Palestinian. [5]

        Both Western and Palestinian interests need to abandon the /Right of
        Return/ and to explicitly accept full Israeli sovereignty over
        Israeli-controlled territory.

        The re-election of Donald Trump offers a change window for this.
        Scrapping any notion of US support for the Right of Return would have
        some of the same character as decisions from his last administration
        to recognise Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and to recognise
        Israeli control of the Golan. These are policies that are grounded in
        reality, and which acknowledge Israeli sovereignty.

    Overhaul the Basic Law,

        The Palestinian Territories have a constitution of sorts that they
        call the /Basic Law/. [6]

        It is broadly and deeply flawed.

        Overhaul it as follows,

        1. Remove all references to Islamic law.

        2. Remove clauses that bind the constitution to the cause of Arab
        nationalism.

        3. Scrap the clause supporting "welfare for families of martyrs" and
        any other references to terrorism.

        4. Reduce references to positive rights, so as to clear the way to a
        neat separation of powers between judiciary, legislature and
        executive. [7]

        5. Remove flowery language and references to symbolism. Refine its
        focus towards administrative matters.

        6. Remove special-privilege clauses, e.g. "welfare for prisoners of
        war".

        7. Strip it back to a minimal core of clauses that are sufficient to
        define the state.

        8. Cleanse the document of any and all concerns that could be
        implemented as legislation. e.g. the current document talks about
        pension commitments. Those are matters for a legislature to sort out,
        they do not belong in a constitution.

    Governor,

        During a transition period, the territory needs a powerful governor
        who will wield executive power. An accomplished foreign diplomat with
        no local business interests should serve in this role. [8]

        The governor's framework should ask them to implement audits that
        measure progress of the jurisdiction.

        These may resemble audits that countries undergo when they seek to
        join the European Union.

        Audits would include hard-metrics about quality-of-life criteria for
        the Palestinian Arabs: access to working air conditioning, uptime of
        the power grid, infant death rates, school attendance, school results,
        workplace participation per household.

    Legal reform,

        The current Palestinian legal system is influenced by Islamic theory,
        which is incompatible with the western institutional value of the
        separation between church and state. Hence, the current system needs
        to go.

        Bootstrap a Common Law system. Common Law originated in England, but
        has been extended to dozens of other countries including Canada,
        Australia, Singapore, India.

        The British have hundreds of years of experience at bootstrapping this
        system in far-away places.

        Per tradition, a foreign team of magistrates should initially serve in
        this role, aided by translators. [9]

        The court should be explicitly mandated to eschew judicial activism.
        The governor and sponsoring government each have the right to recall
        judges.

    Justice,

        The west builds a modular detention facility in the Negev, and
        supports it from a military base.

        Other than detention staff, the entire legal system operates by
        video-call from rooms located in that facility.

        The governor appoints prosecutors, each of which is based in an office
        in a western country.

        Independent magistrates run proceedings from offices in western
        countries.

        Western governments supply a pool of remote bilingual English/Arabic
        speakers. These people can act as good-faith lay advocates for people
        facing charges. They can be appointed by the magistrate to assist
        clients who cannot supply their own representation, which will be most
        people in the early life of the system.

        The principle of /legal professional privilege/ must be sacrosanct,
        with key people responsible for the process to be captured on video
        periodically taking a standing oath to assert the integrity of their
        part of that system. Each should be subject to compliance oversight,
        and would face harsh charges in western courts if ever they were found
        to have given a false oath.

        A key quality of the Common Law legal system is how easy it is to
        bootstrap. Hence, it is not critical to have an ongoing relationship
        with the sponsoring country. Once set up, it could engage talent from
        existing Common Law countries without the need for further political
        endorsement from the bootstrap country.

        This design could evolve gradually towards local legal representation
        and eventually to local magistrates.

        In time there will need to be some kind of constitutional court set up
        that is equivalent to the US Supreme Court / Australian High Court,
        but that is years away and can be structured at a later time.

        The legal system must not be subject to any international oversight
        bodies - the ECJ, the ICC.

        The purpose of this project is to bootstrap a nation-state.
        Internationalist projects explicitly compete with that goal, and so
        should have no role in the project.

    Sovereignty,

        Sovereignty must reside with the Governor.

        The Governor is appointed by the US President, and operates at an
        arm's length.

    Executive power,

        In the early stages of the project the governor will have full
        executive power also - more detail of the stages below.

    Police and Customs,

        The state will need muscle to reliably implement the will of the
        governor and judiciary, and which is not corrupt.

        In this Palestinian setting you will need,

            1. A leadership group who can be relied on to manage the
            execution of responsibilities, which will at times be complex.

            2. An implementation team of police on the ground who can patrol,
            who are able to converse in Arabic and who are seen as impartial
            to special interests by the man in the street.

        Britain maintained a division of (Nepalese) Gurkhas to enforce
        policing through a period of conflict in Malaya. There, the English
        language served as a standard language. The troops were generally seen
        as impartial by the different ethnic groups, and loyal to the rule of
        law.

        The French should direct its Foreign Legion to raise a Gurkha-like
        division from Comoros, a poor nation in the Indian Ocean of bilingual
        French/Arabic speakers. France would supply a leadership structure
        drawn initially from its Gendarmerie and similar units, to be
        gradually replaced with Comoros promotions. Comoros recruits would
        converse with their leadership in French and on the street in Arabic.
        The Comoros economy would benefit from the remittances.

        When the Ukraine war is over, there will be a surplus of veterans
        available to the Foreign Legion.

        Resources at the nearby Negev military base can back up the local
        police with stronger force if it is ever needed.

        This design should keep Israel out of conflict at all levels. This
        reduces Islamist motivation to escalate. Escalation results in
        conflict at first with Arabic-speakers muslims, then with
        French-speaking slavs and latinos, then with English-speakers from
        anglosphere countries, and never with Israelis.

    Market economy,

        Establish a market economy, keep government out of economic affairs.
        Corruption is far easier to avoid if government stays out of business.

        Follow the example of Hong Kong as described in the first episode of
        Milton Friedman's /Free to Choose/ series.

        Keeping government limited will also lower the bar for what is needed
        in the next matter.

    Denazification,

        After the second world war, the occupying allied forces created laws
        in West Germany and other countries designed to purge each country of
        any trace of the defeated regime's ideology.

        The Palestinian territories need laws that outlaw symbols, music, art,
        practices and public speech that reflect Arab Nationalist and Islamist
        sympathies.

        The motive is equivalent to the German setting, but the circumstances
        are different. In defeated Germany there was a rump of a functioning
        state. This is not true of Gaza. The goals are the same, but the path
        will be different.

    Civil service culture,

        The Governor needs to establish an effective civil service.

        This will be a significant responsibility for the governor, assisted
        by foreign hires.

    Defer democracy based on objective criteria,

        The move to democracy will succeed only if it is done gradually and in
        a climate of stability.

        Hence, it will appear in the plan but is not an immediate concern.

    Leverage aid funding to force outcomes,

        External aid bodies should not operate within the target statelet we
        are designing. In those places, the Governor should administer aid.

        There may be a continuing role for aid organisations as a bridge for
        parts of the Palestinian Territories that are not the focus of this
        project.

        Western nations should in all cases refuse to give aid to bodies in
        the region that have failed to recognise and respect Israeli
        sovereignty.

        This principle does apply to the UNRWA, a run-away bureaucracy that
        acts as a conduit for UN funding to the descendants of Palestinian
        refugees. UNRWA employees participated in the 7 October attacks on
        Israeli citizens.

        It should be straightforward for a Trump administration to bring the
        majority of UNRWA donors onboard in order to either strong-arm the
        UNRWA into reform [10] or - preferably - to entirely defund it and
        administer aid without UN involvement.

        The largest sources of funding for the UNRWA are Western: US, EU NATO
        nations, Japan, Switzerland. [11] The first non-western country in the
        list is Saudi, who could be drawn to a new position as part of Abraham
        accord discussions.

    Ignore the UN, prioritise relations with the US,

        The UN council is awash with bad faith actors. For example - countries
        who posture their support for Palestinian causes, but then refuse to
        accept Palestinian refugees.

        UN agencies operating in the region have been constantly incapable.

        This project needs to deliberately ignore UN influence.

        Instead, coordinate a settlement through the United States.

    Avoid western activists,

        There is a certain sort of westerner who would be attracted to this
        project, and who must be avoided.

        When appointing foreigners, the settlement must take a zero-tolerance
        attitude towards activist appointees. i.e. Westerners who seek to work
        in the project due to their attachment to the idea of Palestinians as
        a victim civilisation.

        Such agents would be tempted to prioritise their investment in
        oppressor narratives over their responsibilities to the best interests
        of the Palestinian Arabs, and should be filtered.

    No fixed timeline, progress is driven by results,

        In this model, I propose there should be no fixed timeline for
        establishing Palestinian authority over a Palestinian state. A fixed
        timeline would encourage a wait-out-the-clock strategy from interests
        who are resistant to western institutions.

        Instead, progress towards Palestinian autonomy should be based on
        qualitative assessments taken by the collaboration powers, and
        informed by independent audits.

Here is a set of stages that could be followed for rolling this out.

    1. The "Order and Stability" stage,
    
        The US State Department appoints a Governor.

        This Governor is mandated to pursue the best interests of the
        Palestinian people within a framework.

        The Governor has full authority within the region, subject to that
        oversight. This includes the right to some form of low-process
        detention.

        Legislation is published by the governor's office.

        Bootstrap police and customs.

        Bootstrap a Common Law legal system, focusing on civil matters, and
        able to handle criminal matters by referral from the Governor.

        Institute denazification.

        Offer an amnesty program to have citizens surrender weapons and
        weapons paraphernalia.

        This stage will focus on power consolidation, and immediate
        improvements to quality-of-life matters for citizens of the region.
        Food, energy, sanitation, shelter, hospitals.

    2. The "Judicial Oversight" stage,

        The Governor continues to serve as the executive, and starts to
        develop a chamber of advisers. This is an embryonic legislature.

        This legislature is still heavily foreign but will come to include
        honourable and well-regarded Palestinians.

        Low-process detention is changed to require a magistrate's approval.

        Develop an education system.

        The effort will focus on reducing government intervention so that a
        market economy can emerge.

        The Governor and the nation sponsoring the judicial system work
        together to produce a framework for selecting judicial appointments.

    3. The "Effective Service" stage,

        This era should focus on establishing an effective civil service that
        gradually incorporates local talent. It should not move past this
        stage until metrics reveal the civil service to be effective.

        Establish a civil service code of conduct, and a taxing entrance exam.

        A particular challenge will be establishing a competent planning
        authority. Periods of rapid property development create the
        circumstances for corruption. The governor should direct particular
        effort to mitigations. This may involve some kind of independent and
        evidence-based signoff of major planning works.

        During this period, the Governor appoints a speaker to coordinate
        operation of his legislative chamber.

        At the end of this stage, the legislature will lay out a non-partisan
        set of principles for an electoral commission, and that new commission
        will go about establishing an electoral roll and a means of conducting
        fair elections.

    4. The "Unicameral" stage,

        The Governor continues to serve as the executive.

        The Governor's chamber continues to be appointed, but this chamber is
        evolving towards becoming a "lower-house" for the nation state.

        The governor opens some positions in the chamber which can be elected.
        To start with, the electorates are large. This will result in only a
        small number of elected members with middle-of-the-road sensibilities.

        This number of electorates can grow gradually, based on the success of
        attracting people of good calibre to the chamber.

        People vote for candidates for the legislature based on a
        single-member electorate system with preferential votes. People are
        encouraged to vote for candidates based on their administrative
        credentials. The governor has an open right to dismiss and detain
        people who pursue rabble-raising rhetoric, even if it does not fall
        foul of denazification policies. The Governor should use this power to
        set an example, and to set the tone of the chamber.

        A Prime Minister will form a cabinet drawn from the talent in the
        chamber. This can be used as a means of gradually cultivating
        executive competence from elected members.

        There should be an effort in this stage to cultivate political
        parties. These should be constituted as being local-only (i.e. not
        part of global political movements), and with clear rules about
        governance and sources of funds.

        Establish an ombudsman's office.

        The project needs to stay in this state until (1) the project has
        moved beyond all tinges of Islamism and Arab Nationalism and (2) the
        elected members have a surplus of talent to be able to carry on
        executive responsibility for the project in a two-party system.

    5. The "Bicameral" stage,

        Create a second chamber of parliament. Elected members stay in the
        lower house. Appointed members move to the upper house.

        The legislature consists of a mix of governor-appointed candidates and
        democratically elected candidates.

        The effort should focus on developing a culture of merit based
        appointment to the upper house. The House of Lords and historic
        culture of the Tasmanian upper house (by convention, elected
        candidates are do not belong to political parties) should serve as
        examples.

        This era should gradually in-house police and customs.

        Towards the end of this era, ensure that planning authority decisions
        are subject to judicial oversight.

    6. The "Domestic Autonomy" stage,

        The Prime Minister recommends judicial appointments to the Prime
        Minister.

        For foreign affairs and border security, all power resides with the
        governor (under US supervision). Customs oversight stays with the
        Governor.

        The Governor retains full powers to over-ride the Prime Minister on
        all matters, and would be obliged to do so if a rabble-rousing culture
        emerges.

        Other than that, the role of the Prime Minister should become more
        powerful, with the Governor following a convention of acting on their
        advice of their Prime Minister for domestic matters.

        The Governor should seek to include the Prime Minister on
        international matters so as to develop local experience in this space.

        This era should seek to gradually in-house legal talent. There is no
        special pressure to appoint judges from the local population, but the
        Governor could consider strong talent.

    7. The "Full Autonomy" stage,

        Governor releases executive responsibility to the Prime Minister, and
        the Governor becomes a symbolic position, equivalent to the the head
        of state of commonwealth countries.

        Future governors to be appointed based on a vote of 2/3s of the lower
        house.

        At this point, the Prime Minister becomes responsible for its own
        customs and security arrangements, and foreign affairs.

If the west set out to build a statelet like this, we should expect the first
one to take fifty years, but be open to it taking longer.

Many self-described /progressives/ would oppose this model due to its colonial
character. These objections would be grounded in aesthetics rather than
tangible arguments. The colonial character of these proposals are strong
arguments in support of the model, because those models have produced success
stories in a variety of difficult circumstances in the past.

In particular, we should look to these traditions of colonial nation-building,

    1. British colonial system leading to functioning democracies,

        Britain bootstrapped Australia with a rough population of convicted
        criminals and soldiers, and maintained order from London via remote
        governors. This was in a period long before fast global communication.

        There are different but similar stories for Singapore, Hong Kong and
        New Zealand.

        The situation in the Americas are more complex, due to great-power
        conflicts, but also shows evidence of success in Canada.

    2. American order after the Second World War

        After the war, the US dominated Japan, West Germany, Taiwan, South
        Korea. Each is now a thriving developed country.

        The US did not rush to give local rule in these locations. Rather, it
        focused on building healthy institutions. In each case, self
        determination was built on results.

        We should have particular admiration for the accomplishment of South
        Korea. Before the second world war, South Korea had no living memory
        of self-rule. Then, it was flattened in the Korean War of the 1950s,
        reduced to ruin equivalent to Gaza now. Within a single generation,
        South Korea transformed into a developed country and functioning
        democracy.

There are counter-example we should be wary of,

    1. Iraqi reconstruction

        After the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the United States rushed to implement
        an elected presidential democracy there. The country's people and
        institutions were not ready for an open-ended democratic settlement.

        This led to a rise in conflict between ethnic groups, including the
        rise of ISIS. Twenty years on, the Iraqi government remains
        overshadowed by ethnic rivalries. It is a highly corrupt country.

        Those who argue for a fast Palestinian State are pursuing a form of
        naive idealism that resembles the American "neocons" who drove the
        rushed and failed democratisation of Iraq. No good would come from
        this.

    2. Afghan reconstruction

        This has much of the same character as Iraq. A meticulous conquest
        mission, followed by a rushed and unsuccessful reconstruction.

    3. India

        After independence, India adopted a central-planning ethos, and built
        a sprawling state to service this. India stagnated for decades, and is
        still working itself out of this legacy.

    4. South Africa

        As the Apartheid era was ending, an group of international advisers
        drew together a new South African constitutional settlement from every
        trendy idea in circulation.
        
        This produced a system made from complex and untested building blocks.

        That project has been a comprehensive failure: South Africa governance
        is worse than it has ever been, the country now has a well-entrenched
        corruption culture.

    5. Lebanon

        There is an unwritten agreement between political groups in Lebanon
        called the /National Pact/. Part of the agreement is that different
        roles must be held by people from different religious faiths. For
        example, the Prime Minister must be a Sunni Muslim, and the head of
        the armed forces must be a Maronite Catholic.

        This design socialises the country towards permanent ethnic division.
        The poor performance of the Lebanese settlement illustrates the
        importance of getting a solid constitutional settlement in place.

    6. Cyprus, Malta, some Caribbean Islands, some African counties

        In the 20th century, the British rapidly withdrew authority from some
        countries before civil service standards were adequate. Typically
        these countries retain a respectable common-law judiciary but have a
        flawed civil service.

        Sometimes the major weakness in these countries is the weak conviction
        of the man in the street towards institutions. When presented with
        clear facts about systematic corruption he shrugs his shoulders and
        says, "that is just how it is here". [12]

Israel dominates hard power concerns in its region.

Since the mid-90s, several Israeli governments engaged in negotiations towards
an independent Palestinian state. In one case the Palestinian representative
was offered everything he had asked for except the Right of Return, and
declined the deal.

The Palestinian leadership had to do no work to get a seat at the table for
those discussions.

Recent events have changed the dynamic,

    The 7 October 2023 campaign by Hamas to murder and kidnap Israeli
    civilians traumatised Israel, and demonstrated exceptionally poor
    judgement by Hamas.

    The sympathetic noises towards Palestinian causes after those attacks in
    the West Bank, in the Arab world, and even in parts of the West.

    The strategy by Hamas of hiding behind its own civilian population, in
    order to farm dead Arab civilians into international support.

    The lack of meaningful value they received from that support.

    A successful Israeli military campaign to crush Hamas.
    
    A successful Israeli military campaign to crush Hezbollah.

    That this success came despite the US discouraging Israel from pursuing
    military action.

    The resulting diminishing of Iran.

    The collapse of the Assad regime in Syria.

    Israeli seizure of strategic Syrian territory north-west of its Golan
    Heights region.

Israel has achieved victory after victory over the last year through the use
of hard power and determination and is experiencing a level of confidence not
seen for decades. In light of this, it seems fanciful that Israel would
entertain the sort of land-for-peace proposals that they have offered in
the past. [13] [14]

We should expect Israel to ignore low-effort calls for Palestinian statehood.

However, Israel does have an interest. When the territories are in poor order,
this creates security problems for them. A convincing strategy would find an
audience.

It is viable to destroy Hamas in Gaza,

    Consider that at the start of the current war, Israel believed that Hamas
    had 30k fighters from a total Gaza population of 2.1 million people.

    Assume that each Hamas fighter comes from a distinct nuclear family (this
    will be an over-estimate), that each nuclear family has an average of six
    members who are teenagers or older, and that all adult members of a family
    that have a Hamas fighter are also true-believers.

    That number comes to about 8.5% of the population of Gaza. And that is
    despite the significant material incentives there are to participate in
    Hamas - it is likely that some of the people in Hamas joined to access the
    material benefits rather than because they are true believers.

    Those were pre-war numbers. A lot of Hamas fighters have been killed, and
    Hamas looks stupid for triggering a war that has gone so poorly. The level
    of true-believer support will be lower now.

    The key to breaking Hamas is to restrict its ability to use violence on
    civilians, to destroy its true-believer base, and to offer the man in the
    street a clear alternative that offers a better future for their children.
    (i.e. not Fatah)

This paper started out with me reflecting on the two key problems in the
region. I highlighted these: a refusal by Palestinian groups to accept the
outcomes of long-lost wars, and the awful state of Palestinian institutions.
At that time I was reflecting on how implausible the two-state solution
seemed. But, then I considered Niall Ferguson's comments about institutions
and asked myself whether there was a path available. The notes are my current
best-effort to answer that question.

When we talk about a two-state solution, we should understand that this is the
level of commitment it would take. It needs fifty years of partnership,
investment, and patient resolve. Commitment short of this would lead to a
degenerate state, and renewed wars.

There is no evidence that the political will for such a project exists in the
suggested collaboration countries at this time. Yet, the circumstances make
this the best time in decades to contemplate it.

Assume this does not happen. What then? We should expect the following,

    That the flow of aid money will resume, and that this will fund a rebuild
    of Palestinian revolutionary groups.

    These groups will be cultivated be anti-Western interests.

    These groups will find new ways to antagonise Israel.

    These groups will continue to seek a path to power in other Arab
    countries. At some point they may succeed - for example - in Jordan, or as
    part of an anti-western group in Lebanon or Syria.

Across the West, we need to be wary. Migration patterns and the rise of the
Internet are increasing the reach of these groups into Western countries. Note
the emergence of terrorist activity against Jews in Australia following the
October 7 attacks.


==
:1
    Seen in a recent youtube interview. Unfortunately I do not have a copy of
    the link. I am sure I will watch some content soon where he mentions it
    again and will update here when I do.

:2
    I use the terms /bootstrap/ and /bootstrapping/ often. The terms are used
    in computer science to describe the act of building a system to a standard
    where it can function by itself, without further external inputs. The term
    is an allusion to the idea that you can pull yourself up by your own
    bootstraps - which implies the significant challenges of such projects.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bootstrapping

:3
    Former Romanian intelligence chief Ion Mihai Pacepa published a book /Red
    Horizons/ in the late 80s and a decade after his defection to the US.
    Early chapters describe interactions between Romanian intelligence and
    Arafat, and quote him discussing these dynamics.

    Once you appreciate this, the extent of Bill Clinton's idealism becomes
    clear. Clinton attempted to have Yasser Arafat guarantee Palestinian
    support for a peace deal with Israel. But Arafat did not rule Palestinian
    interests - rather, he was the most prominent activist in a revolutionary
    organisation that found common cause only in its shared struggle against
    Israel.

:4
    Britain is the obvious choice due to the origin of Common Law in England.
    Australia or Canada would do equally well.

:5
    See http://songseed.org/post/20240514.aa.right.of.return.txt

:6
    https://security-legislation.ps/latest-laws/the-amended-basic-law-of-2003/

:7
    That is - on the subject of rights, be guided by the example of the
    Australian constitution, rather than the US settlement. Positive rights
    force judges into activism, which undermines separation of powers and
    future intent to install democracy.

:8
    Consider that this model used to manage colonies in Australia, Singapore
    and Hong Kong. Alternately, you could view the person as being similar to
    the governors of the Coalition Provisional Authority posted in Iraq after
    the 2003 invasion.

:9
    There is a recent tradition where Australia supplied magistrates to
    Pacific Islands along the lines proposed here.

:10
    A reviewer of this essay pointed me to an interview with Alexander Downer,
    Australian's former minister between 1996 and 2007. Downer views UNRWA as
    beyond reform and calls for abolition,
    https://youtube.com/watch?v=wSDfUHnOSBo

:11
    https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/17/which-countries-are-still-funding-unrwa

:12
    Meanwhile,

        In Hong Kong, the Umbrella Movement displayed stunning resolve in
        defence of western institutional values.

        MPs fall in quick succession in the UK in the wake of a parliamentary
        expenses scandal.

    Singapore, Australia, and Canada serve as examples of countries where the
    handover was gradual, and where institutions stayed strong after full
    independence. There is every sign that Hong Kong would have done also, but
    its people have so far been denied that opportunity.

:13
    Note that where land-for-peace deals have been struck, they have given
    terrible results. 1. After their South Lebanon withdrawal Hezbollah
    occupied the region and made rocket attacks on Israeli civilian populations
    for years. 2. The forced withdrawal of settlers and security from Gaza
    predated a Hamas takeover and, once again, years of rocket attacks against
    civilian populations, followed by the October 7 attacks.

:14
    Commentary by Thomas Sowell on land-for-peace,
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aozxj-no98M&ab_channel=ThomasSowellTV